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In the era of big data, where people find themselves surveilled in ever more 
finely granulated aspects of their lives, and where the data profiles built from an 
accumulation of data gathered about themselves and others are used to predict as 
well as shape their behaviours, the question of privacy protection arises 
constantly. In this article we interrogate whether the discourse of privacy is 
sufficient to address this new paradigm of information flow and control. What we 
confront in this area is a set of practices concerning the collection, aggregation, 
sharing, interrogation and uses of data on a scale that crosses private and public 
boundaries, jurisdictional boundaries, and importantly, the boundaries between 
reality and simulation. The consequences of these practices are emerging as 
sometimes useful and sometimes damaging to governments, citizens and 
commercial organisations. Understanding how to regulate this sphere of activity 
to address the harms, to create an infrastructure of accountability, and to bring 
more transparency to the practices mentioned, is a challenge of some complexity. 
Using privacy frameworks may not provide the solutions or protections that 
ultimately are being sought.  
This article is concerned with data gathering and surveillance practices, by 
business and government, and the implications for individual privacy in the face 
of widespread collection and use of big data. We will firstly outline the practices 
around data and the issues that arise from such practices. We then consider how 
courts in the United Kingdom (‘UK’) and the United States (‘US’) are attempting 
to frame these issues using current legal frameworks, and finish by considering 
the Australian context. Notably the discourse around privacy protection differs 
significantly across these jurisdictions, encompassing elements of constitutional 
rights and freedoms, specific legislative schemes, data protection, anti-terrorist 
and criminal laws, tort and equity. This lack of a common understanding of what 
is or what should be encompassed within privacy makes it a very fragile creature 
indeed. 
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On the basis of the exploration of these issues, we conclude that current laws 
are ill-equipped to deal with the multifaceted threats to individual privacy by 
governments, corporations and our own need to participate in the information 
society. 
I    PRACTICES 
In this Part, we consider how information about people is now subjected to 
new practices brought about through the networked digital communications that 
have become prevalent in the lives of most people.  
‘[T]he power of personal information lies at the heart of surveillance.’1 
Surveillance can be described as ‘the focused, systematic and routine attention to 
personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction.’2 
In Deleuzian terms, in the surveillance society, surveillance (and therefore 
control) is a cumulative process of interlocking networks and ‘relies on historical 
data to forge new visibilities.’3 A key aspect of this new ‘age of surveillance’ is 
lack of clear differentiation between surveillance by (or on behalf of) 
governments and that conducted by commercial entities. ‘Public- and private-
sector surveillance are intertwined – they use the same technologies and 
techniques, they operate through a variety of public/private partnerships, and 
their digital fruits can easily cross the public/private divide.’ 4  Due to the 
proliferation of services, and the complexity of regulatory regimes, agencies 
increasingly seek to automate their decisions.5 Automated systems are thought to 
ensure consistent decisions as the rules are interpreted in the same way in every 
case.6 Whether the algorithmic rules and the available data upon which the rules 
are based are accurate is often obscured behind a discourse of technological 
objectivity.  
The inferential techniques used to analyse the information can provide 
accurate and timely insights into complicated issues. 7  However, as Citron 
observes, the ‘opacity of automated systems shields them from scrutiny’ as 
                                                
1 Neil M Richards, ‘The Dangers of Surveillance’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 1934, 1953. 
2 David Lyon, Surveillance Studies: An Overview (Polity Press, 2007) 14. 
3 Karl Palmås, ‘Predicting What You’ll Do Tomorrow: Panspectric Surveillance and the Contemporary 
Corporation’ (2011) 8 Surveillance & Society 338, 342, citing Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies 
of Control’ (1992) 59 October 3, 5–6. 
4 Richards, above n 1, 1958. 
5 Danielle Keats Citron, ‘Technological Due Process’ (2008) 85 Washington University Law Review 1249, 
1258; James Grimmelmann, ‘Regulation by Software’ (2005) 114 Yale Law Review 1719, 1734.  
6 See Citron, above n 5, 1253 citing William D Eggers, Government 2.0: Using Technology to Improve 
Education, Cut Red Tape, Reduce Gridlock, and Enhance Democracy (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2005) 113. 
7 David Bollier, ‘The Promise and Peril of Big Data’ (Aspen Institute, 2010) 2. 
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‘citizens cannot see or debate these new rules’,8 and algorithmic decision-making 
based on data raises issues of ‘technological due process’.9 
 
A    Collection 
Data collection has become almost ubiquitous – it is carried out in public 
spaces and in private spaces. People sometimes volunteer their information and 
sometimes it is harvested from their actions without them knowing. Thus a 
person may fill out a form online and give information about themselves to a 
commercial or government organisation – usually in exchange for some kind of 
goods or services. However, volunteering this information is not necessarily a 
sign that they have consented to the ways in which it is used.10 As Solove points 
out, the downstream uses of data may not be known to the person, particularly as 
their data may be aggregated with other data over time.11 The privacy policies of 
many collecting sites often include terms that indicate they share information 
with third parties and cannot control what those third parties do with the 
information. 12  Control of its uses is basically lost at the point of sharing. 
Interestingly, the people who hold and deploy the data may not know its uses if it 
is subjected to algorithms that interrogate it using automated and computationally 
generated processes – a practice discussed further below. 
Data can also be collected involuntarily or covertly in many places and 
through many practices. Public places are not only under surveillance through 
technologies such as closed-circuit television (‘CCTV’) cameras, but also 
increasingly through scanning technologies which, for instance, may collect data 
from peoples’ mobile phones as they pass through a space.13 Phones may be open 
through Bluetooth and wi-fi networks. A phone that is automatically scanning for 
a wireless network as a person walks through a mall can be read for information 
about many other activities – global positioning system (‘GPS’) location data 
may be read for information about where that person has been, contact lists may 
be harvested and so on. Radio frequency identification (‘RFID’) tags may be 
                                                
8 Citron, above n 5, 1254.  
9 Ibid 1258. 
10 Alice E Marwick, ‘How Your Data Are Being Deeply Mined’ (2014) 61(1) New York Review of Books 
<http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/jan/09/how-your-data-are-being-deeply-mined/>. 
11  Daniel Solove, ‘Introduction: Privacy, Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma’ (2013) 26 Harvard 
Law Review 1880, 1889–90. 
12  For instance, the privacy policy on the website for popular games company Blizzard contains the 
following statement: ‘Please be aware that we cannot control the activities of third parties to whom we 
provide data, and as such we cannot guarantee that they adhere to the same privacy and security 
procedures as Blizzard.’: Blizzard Entertainment, Privacy Policy (2014) <http://us.blizzard.com/en-
us/company/about/privacy.html>.  
13  Mark Burdon, ‘Mobile Phone Tracking: It’s Not Personal’, The Conversation (online), 11 March 2014 
<http://theconversation.com/mobile-phone-tracking-its-not-personal-23015>. 
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embedded in clothing purchases, giving off readable information about 
purchasing choices and tastes.14 
What have traditionally been thought of as private places and interactions 
have also become the source of much data gathering. Governments and 
commercial organisations collect data from phone calls, online interactions of 
both a social and a commercial nature and so on. Most people are not voluntarily 
giving up this data, but it is almost impossible to prevent its collection.15 
 
B    Aggregation 
The collection of individual data with respect to one phone call or one 
website visit may not appear to be a particularly sinister experience (and in  
fact we are used to being regularly warned about ‘cookies’ collecting  
information when we access a website).16 However, even information regarding 
one transaction may reveal a lot about the customer (for example, calling  
hotlines dealing with domestic violence, suicide, depression or drug addiction).17 
However, it becomes an even more troubling experience when the data trail that 
we leave is collected and aggregated from a variety of different sources, both 
online and offline.18 The aggregation of data is performed both by commercial 
and government agencies and can provide a wealth of detail regarding personal 
habits, preferences, relationships and social networks. It collapses the divides that 
all people create between different areas of their lives.19 We perform different 
aspects of ourselves in different contexts – we tailor our behaviour for work 
differently than we do for home, or for our friends, and so on.20 The aggregation 
of data represents a loss of control of our carefully managed identities, collapsing 
the boundaries between private and public personas.  
                                                
14  See generally Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau, ‘Communications Surveillance: Privacy and Security at 
Risk’ (2009) 52(11) Communications of the ACM 42, 47; Marwick, above n 10. 
15  Diffie and Landau, above n 14; Marwick, above n 10. 
16  A ‘cookie’ is a small piece of data which records and uses certain information regarding the user, such as 
authentication, transaction history or order details. 
17  Edward W Felten, ‘Declaration of Professor Edward W Felten’, Submission in American Civil Liberties 
Union v Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 13-cv-03994 (WHP), 26 August 2013, 13–14. See 
also Omer Tene, ‘What Google Knows: Privacy and Internet Search Engines’ [2008] Utah Law Review 
1433, 1442–9, 1458. 
18  Edward W Felten, ‘Declaration of Professor Edward W Felten’, Submission in American Civil Liberties 
Union v Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 13-cv-03994 (WHP), 26 August 2013, 17 [48] 
(emphasis in original): 
Analysis of metadata on this scale can reveal the network of individuals with whom we communicate–
commonly called a social graph. By building a social graph that maps all of an organization’s telephone 
calls over time, one could obtain a set of contacts that includes a substantial portion of the group’s 
membership, donors, political supporters, confidential sources, and so on. Analysis of the metadata 
belonging to these individual callers, by moving one ‘hop’ further out, could help to classify each one, 
eventually yielding a detailed breakdown of the organization’s associational relationships. 
19  danah boyd, ‘Facebook’s Privacy Trainwreck: Exposure, Invasion, and Social Convergence’ (2008) 14 
Convergence: The International Journal of Research into New Media Technologies 13, 18. 
20  Ibid; Erving Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (Anchor Books, 1959). 
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Our personal information has become commercially valuable. We do not reap 
the monetary benefits of commercial exchange in any tangible way, but our data 
is bought and sold by companies which exist solely to trade in the traces we leave 
of ourselves. They sell to other commercial organisations and to governments. 
The aggregation and sharing of data is not something that is in the control of the 
person whose data it is. It not only represents a loss of control, but as Bossewitch 
and Sinnreich point out, it is almost impossible to reverse the process21 – to suck 
back data, to have it removed from a record of you that has proliferated to the 
point where you will never know how many instances of that data exist. 
A further aspect of the aggregation and sharing of data is that one person’s 
data is aggregated with other peoples’ data – often in large sets of anonymised 
data. Through a series of processes discussed below, a personal data profile 
comes to be based not just on that person, but also on ‘people like that person’ as 
identified through these large scale anonymised data sets.22  
Surveilling people’s personally generated data without their knowledge also 
raises ethical concerns about the threat to intellectual freedom and privacy: how 
it ‘affects the power balance between individuals and those who are watching’, 
and the risks of ‘harmful uses of sensitive information’.23  
 
C    Interrogation 
A key aspect of this accumulation of data from multiple sources over long 
periods of time is that the data sets become so large as to be unmanageable. The 
‘infoglut’ is beyond the comprehension of a single person.24 The interrogation of 
the data at this scale is done rather by machines and algorithms.25 This is not to 
say that people are not involved in the process of interrogation – people are 
responsible for writing the algorithms initially, for setting up the database 
categories that define how to think about what is important and what is not (a 
form of knowledge creation) and for ‘cleaning up’ the data to make it ready for 
the database.26 Thus understanding the large datasets becomes the domain of 
those who create the algorithms. And algorithms themselves perform the task of 
pattern recognition on those data sets. How we become known through this 
                                                
21  Jonah Bossewitch and Aram Sinnreich, ‘The End of Forgetting: Strategic Agency beyond the Panopticon’ 
(2012) 15 New Media & Society 224, 226. 
22  Tene, above n 17, 1458. 
23  Richards, above n 1, 1945. Further discussion of these issues: at 1945–58. 
24  See Mark Andrejevic, Infoglut: How Too Much Information Is Changing the Way We Think and Know 
(Routledge, 2013). 
25  Tarleton Gillespie, ‘The Relevance of Algorithms’ in Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo J Boczkowski and Kirsten 
A Foot (eds), Media Technologies: Essays on Communication, Materiality, and Society (MIT Press, 
2014) 167. 
26  See ibid 169–72.  
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process, how a personal profile of ‘sufficient accuracy’27 is generated, is to some 
extent based on the ‘tyranny of the pattern’.28  
More interesting still, from the point of view of regulation, is that algorithms 
can be programmed to ‘learn’ as they go. Machine based learning means that 
while a programmer may write the initial algorithm to interrogate the data, the 
algorithm then develops quite free from human intervention, creating its own 
investigations based on the patterns it recognises within the big data sets. Thus 
one person’s profile is arrived at through processes of interrogation opaque even 
to the programmer.29 
The data profiles (which are dynamic rather than static, as the accumulation 
and interrogation of data never stops) will never be a direct correlation to  
our ‘real’ selves. Decisions that we make that have been captured in data form 
can be de-contextualised and misinterpreted, motivations for particular actions 
are never explained or understood by the recording of them, and various things 
about us still escape capture. But this is not the only reason our profiles may be 
erroneous or misleading. Our profiles are often the result (as mentioned above) of 
the aggregation of our data with other peoples’ data. We have been recognised 
through algorithms as being ‘like’ a variety of other people, and those peoples’ 
choices and behaviours are absorbed into our profile as we are absorbed  
into theirs.30 Furthermore, as Braman points out, there are practices designed  
to protect peoples’ privacy, for example wherein aspects of their data  
are deliberately falsified before being shared in order to make the data  
more anonymous.31 However, in the process of re-identification, which often is 
performed in a different context, such falsifications are not known or addressed. 
Our records have been tainted deliberately (ironically for our protection) but it is 
almost impossible to redress this misinformation downstream, where our loss of 
control of our data is almost complete. 
An Australian Communications and Media Authority (‘ACMA’) report on 
how Australians manage their digital identities also noted that people deliberately 
falsify information about themselves as a privacy protection measure.32 Their 
research found that 47 per cent of the Australians surveyed deliberately provided 
false or misleading information about themselves as a form of ‘defensive 
inaccuracy’.33 Where information is demanded by a website in order to gain 
access to that site and its services, people often choose to lie in an effort to 
                                                
27  Ibid 174.  
28  See Nimrod Kozlovski, ‘Designing Accountable Online Policing’ in Jack M Balkin et al (eds), 
Cybercrime: Digital Cops in a Networked Environment (New York University Press, 2007) 107, 115, 
discussing the ‘tyranny of patterns’ over accuracy. 
29 See Gillespie, above n 25, 172. 
30  Richards, above n 1, 1939. 
31  Sandra Braman, ‘Tactical Memory: The Politics of Openness in the Construction of Memory’ (2006) 
11(7) First Monday <http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/1363/1282>. 
32 ACMA (Cth), Managing Your Digital Identity: Digital Footprints and Identities Research Short Report 1 
(2013) 6–8. 
33 Ibid 6–7. 
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protect their identities. Thus that information, which is pulled into the data 
stream, will also feed into inaccuracies in a person’s data profile that may or may 
not be damaging once that data is put to use in different contexts (say for credit 
applications, housing applications, or criminal profiling). Algorithms find 
patterns; they do not ask questions about the meaning of data or why particular 
choices are made by people.34  
 
D    Prediction 
The uses made of data profiles that have been constructed through the above 
practices are consequently of great importance. Commercial uses such as selling 
profiles to advertisers are well established and in some ways can be seen as an 
extension of the practice of selling media audiences to advertisers which has 
sustained media businesses for many decades. The difference now is the more 
finely granulated targeting of advertisements to individuals. The sharing of 
profiles with government agencies, particularly security agencies is more 
controversial. It can be seen as a way for security agencies to circumvent the 
accountability and transparency mechanisms in place for the surveillance of 
citizens by ‘outsourcing’ the collection of data to commercial organisations, 
which also are often global in their reach and can ignore jurisdictional boundaries 
that restrict government activities.35 The state thus has a vested interest in 
bolstering the power of corporations to gather information. While European data 
protection laws may attempt greater constraints on corporate data collection and 
storage,36 the US government takes a very different stance toward regulating 
corporate practices. The revelations by Edward Snowden of the National Security 
Agency (‘NSA’) programs in 2013 involving big data give ample explanation as 
to how and why this stance is taken, as discussed below. 
Of equal importance though, is the turn to prediction as a key  
mode of operation.37 What big data offers both commercial and governmental 
organisations therefore is the seduction of predicting the future through the 
pattern recognitions offered by the algorithms interrogating the data: ‘[t]he 
promise of predictive analytics is to incorporate the future as a set of anticipated 
data points into the decision-making process’.38  
                                                
34 See Andrejevic, above n 24, 1–41. 
35 See, eg, Michael D Birnhack and Niva Elkin-Koren, ‘The Invisible Handshake: The Reemergence of the 
State in the Digital Environment’ (2003) 8(6) Virginia Journal of Law and Technology 1, 17 [41]. 
36 See, eg, Tene, above n 17, 1437, 1459–60. See further discussion below. 
37 See, eg, Edward W Felten, ‘Declaration of Professor Edward W Felten’, Submission in American Civil 
Liberties Union v Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 13-cv-03994 (WHP), 26 August 2013, 
20–1 [61] (citations omitted):  
Researchers have discovered that individuals have unique calling patterns, regardless of which telephone 
they are using, they have figured out how to predict the kind of device that is making the calls (a 
telephone or a fax machine), developed algorithms capable of predicting whether the phone line is used by 
a business or for personal use, identified callers by social group (workers, commuters, and students) based 
on their calling patterns, and even estimated the personality traits of individual subscribers.  
38 See Andrejevic, above n 24, 29. 
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Here we see the boundary between reality and simulation being crossed and 
recrossed as data is de-identified, aggregated, and interrogated by algorithms 
searching for patterns that might not otherwise have been noticed by human 
inquiry. Data is then reassembled into profiles that, while they look like a 
complete picture of someone, actually represent the aggregation of data from 
both that person and people the algorithms identify as like that person. Many 
aspects of data about that person may be left out, but predictions are made 
nonetheless, about their future behaviour.39 What is interesting and worrying 
about this process is that the constitution of such profiles is opaque.  
Pattern recognition is about correlations rather than causal relations. 
Algorithms notice correlations in data fragments without ever attempting to 
contextualise or explain.40 They might notice for instance, that men who buy 
Schick razors are more likely to vote Republican, but they will not be able to 
provide an explanation. Thus if you are a man buying a Schick razor, the 
algorithm might predict that you also vote Republican. This is not based on any 
real understanding of you and your actions and motivations. 
What needs to be understood is that this system of profiling and prediction is 
dynamic. As the data gathered is constantly updating, the algorithms may, upon 
the input of further data, find this correlation no longer holds (it does not care 
why), and so at a different point in time, will not predict that, as a Schick-buying 
man, you will vote Republican. Thus the predictions are always based on 
snapshots in time that could not be described as stable.41 While this may not be a 
big issue in relation to marketing and the harms to an individual in their life as a 
consumer, it definitely takes on a problematic flavour if we consider criminal 
profiling or terrorist profiling.42 If an algorithm, based on pattern recognition, 
constructs a profile of a person based not only on their own actions but the data 
gathered from other people whom the algorithm has determined are like that 
person (due to the choices it attributes to each), and at a given point in time, 
assesses that person as likely to commit a criminal act, or likely to be a terrorist, 
it may, sometime later, and with additional data, change its categorisation. As 
Amoore suggests, a profile could send up a flag one day but not the next.43 The 
algorithms may, upon further calculations, take that person out of the category of 
likely criminal/terrorist. The predictions are not based on what will really 
happen. They are predictions, not facts. And yet, security agencies seeking to 
prevent acts, rather than address or respond to actual events, may well be 
seduced into treating these profiles and predictions as real. And if a person 
happens to be targeted through profiling based on a moment when they were 
                                                
39 Richards, above n 1, 1957, discussing use of consumer data by Target stores. 
40 Gillespie, above n 25, 174. 
41 See, eg, John Cheney-Lippold, ‘A New Algorithmic Identity: Soft Biopolitics and the Modulation of 
Control’ (2011) 28(6) Theory, Culture & Society 164, 169–70. 
42 See, eg, Louise Amoore, ‘Data Derivatives: On the Emergence of a Security Risk Calculus for Our 
Times’ (2011) 28(6) Theory, Culture & Society 24, 32. 
43 Ibid. 
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algorithmically predicted to belong to a category, it will be very difficult to find 
some form of redress. Using machine generated calculations means that even the 
people who write the algorithms do not really know what the algorithm was 
recognising and aggregating at the moment in time when it categorised a person. 
The algorithm will likely have morphed into something different by the time 
redress is sought.44 
If we consider what it might take to challenge inaccuracies in a data profile – 
particularly if that profile has been used in a way that is detrimental to a person – 
the process is not the same as challenging inaccuracies of data kept about a 
person’s actual life actions. That would be about the data collection (and 
possibly archiving) on a person. As Crawford and Schulz suggest, there needs to 
be a means to ‘audit the data that was used to make a determination’ on 
someone,45 which means data from a range of sources, not all of them from the 
actual person. A decision based on a data profile is a decision based on 
predictions derived from that person and many other people as well. The data 
profile represents many different categorisations that have been made across a 
range of data. Predictive algorithms, having found patterns across large sets of 
data, and having determined correlations that may or may not hold, might 
categorise a person without any regard to their actual behaviour, but more on 
who the algorithm predicts they are.46 But as Andrejevic points out, although 
people are behind the process of deciding what is important to notice and what 
can be ignored at some point, the algorithms are also programmed to learn, 
machinically, and transform as they proceed.47 Thus the chances of transparency 
and accountability become exceedingly remote as even the programmers who 
write the algorithms lose track of what those algorithms are actually calculating 
and interrogating.  
 
II    CHALLENGES CREATED BY CURRENT DATA PRACTICES 
From this brief overview of some aspects of current data collection and usage 
practices it can be seen that regulation of this area is a difficult challenge. Privacy 
regulation through privacy statutes, common law and data protection laws links 
an individual to their records, protecting the records in order to protect the 
interests of the related individual. Big data seemingly severs the individual from 
                                                
44 Gillespie, above n 25, 172. 
45 Discussing ‘data due process’: Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz, ‘Big Data and Due Process: Toward a 
Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms’ (2014) 55 Boston College Law Review 93, 117. See 
also Sara M Watson, ‘Data Doppelgängers and the Uncanny Valley of Personalization’, The Atlantic 
(online), 16 June 2014 <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/06/data-doppelgangers-and-
the-uncanny-valley-of-personalization/372780/>: ‘We need to demand more ways to keep our data 
doppelgängers in check.’ 
46  See Gillespie, above n 25, 173–4.  
47  See Andrejevic, above n 24, 1–41. 
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their data, thus removing the justifications for protection under traditional 
concepts of privacy. However, the mass collection of seemingly de-identified 
data may in fact now result in the generation of more detailed and more accurate 
profiles of a larger number of individuals than more targeted surveillance of the 
individuals could produce.48 The impact of the collection and use of metadata 
must therefore be assessed through a different lens. 
Privacy regulation in Australia deals primarily with restricting the collection, 
use of and access to particular categories of information about a person by the 
public, government or corporations.49 But in the space of big data, many of the 
fixed boundaries around information that are part of how privacy regulation can 
structure a regulatory system using gates and walls, are simply not found. 
Algorithms voraciously travel across many boundaries. The processes involved 
in data analytics, predictive analytics and the creation of data profiles tend to 
exceed the forms and assumptions of privacy regulation. Algorithms may create 
new categories on the fly, thus exceeding regulatory mechanisms that attempt to 
quarantine content from use through categories.50 The idea of consent becomes 
unworkable in an environment where it is not known, even by the people 
collecting and selling data, what will happen to the data – one cannot give 
meaningful consent to an unknown use of data downstream in the process.51 
Further, the notion of consent is compromised where the user must consent to 
disclose certain personal data in order to use (increasingly ubiquitous) services 
such as apps, social media, search engines, or email. For example, internet radio 
app Pandora now claims that an algorithm based on its subscribers’ voluntarily 
disclosed music preferences and election results enables it to predict users’ 
voting preferences with great accuracy.52 Pandora users are required to disclose 
                                                
48  See generally Edward W Felten, ‘Declaration of Professor Edward W Felten’, Submission in American 
Civil Liberties Union v Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 13-cv-03994 (WHP), 26 August 
2013, 22 [64]:  
The privacy impact of collecting all communications metadata about a single person for long periods of 
time is qualitatively different than doing so over a period of days. Similarly, the privacy impact of 
assembling the call records of every American is vastly greater than the impact of collecting data about a 
single person or even groups of people. Mass collection not only allows the government to learn 
information about more people, but it also enables the government to learn new, previously private facts 
that it could not have learned simply by collecting the information about a few, specific individuals. 
49  See generally Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). This relates to personal information disclosed by individuals or 
collected about the individual for the purposes of transacting with that agency, department, business or 
company in some way. It would not apply to calculations or algorithmic assumptions based on 
anonymous data. Similar limitations apply in privacy laws in the UK and US, see: Human Rights Act 
1998 (UK) c 42, sch 1 art 8; Stored Communications Act, 18 USC §§2701–12 (1986); Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 18 USC §§2510–22.  
50  Crawford and Schultz, above n 45, 106. 
51  See, eg, Solove, above n 11, 1881. 
52  Elizabeth Dwoskin, ‘Pandora Thinks It Knows if You Are a Republican’, The Wall Street Journal 
(online), 13 February 2014 <http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023043150045 
79381393567130078>. 
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personal preferences and information in order to facilitate targeted advertising 
and thus subscribe to the ‘free’ service.  
Solove points out that regulation based on consent is ineffective when, as is 
the case with data gathering currently, the scale of the exercise is unmanageable, 
the downstream uses are difficult to assess, and assessing harm is also difficult 
when harm can be cumulative,53 and social rather than individual (for instance in 
the case of racial profiling). One cannot seek to have the record corrected if the 
data identified as incorrect has been proliferated across an unknown number of 
nodes of the network and may be working in any number of profiles – both of the 
person and of other people.54 The proliferation of sites where data about a person 
are held, and the possibilities of it being archived over and over make the idea of 
redress on this level an impossibility. Ironically, as Amoore points out, 
algorithms do not need to archive data or store it.55 They are the calculating 
processes that look at data and move on – making associative connections and 
changing constantly in iterative processes that suggest constant dynamism – 
rather than fixity and static categories that can be grasped and controlled by 
regulatory mechanisms of the kind seen in current privacy regimes. Crawford and 
Schulz suggest that rather than attempting to erect walls around categories 
(which algorithms will change or discard anyway) the idea of regulation must 
instead focus on the processes involved in establishing algorithms and the use of 
the resulting conclusions.56 Although this notion of due process, the right to 
correct the record, and proper disclosure of both the use of predictive data 
derivatives and disclosure of the sources those predictions are based upon, seems 
more plausible than focusing on content, in reality even these measures of 
procedural fairness would be difficult to implement.  
Focussing on processes and uses of both personally identifiable information 
and predictive data represents a shift away from privacy protection frameworks 
designed to restrict the capture and storage of data, and limit access and uses 
based on content categories. These mechanisms seem to be no longer adequate or 
appropriate, although the desire for accountability and transparency remain. The 
intersection of the discourses of privacy with those of security and risk ensure 
that governments find themselves with internal conflicts of interest. Attempts to 
minimise risk and to enhance security are often in conflict with obligations to 
ensure the privacy of citizens,57 and many governments seem reluctant to restrict 
the former in favour of the latter. As Dean points out, the encroachments of the 
                                                
53  Solove, above n 11, 1888–90, 1892. 
54  See generally Bossewitch and Sinnreich, above n 21, 226. 
55  Amoore, above n 42, 33. 
56  Crawford and Schultz, above n 45, 106, 109. 
57  See Sal Humphreys, ‘Predicting, Securing and Shaping the Future: Mechanisms of Governance in Online 
Social Environments’ (2013) 9 International Journal of Media and Cultural Politics 247, 252–5. 
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security arm of government through the normalisation of ‘crisis’ situations 
requiring the overriding of citizen privacy rights is now well established.58  
We will now turn to the specific legal issues which have recently been 
litigated in the US and UK concerning big data. 
 
III    LEGAL RESPONSES: US AND UK EXPERIENCES 
A    Metadata Capture: Section 215 Program and PRISM 
The issue of privacy, surveillance and mass data capture came to the  
forefront in June 2013 with the revelations by former NSA contractor Edward 
Snowden that the US government, through its various agencies, was engaging in 
massive scale collection of data from both its own and foreign citizens.59 This 
data collection was occurring in the context of two separate but similar programs: 
the first, known as the ‘section 215 program’ facilitated the collection of 
telephony metadata, capturing caller ID, numbers dialed, place of call, duration 
and other information, but not including the content of the call. One of 
Snowden’s first leaks revealed that Verizon, a major US telecommunications 
provider, was compelled by order of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(‘FISC’)60 to produce to the NSA daily records of all telephony metadata for 
communication between the US and abroad and wholly within the US, including 
local telephone calls.61 In response to these disclosures the US government 
confirmed that such a program did in fact exist, pursuant to which ‘the FBI 
obtains orders from the FISC pursuant to Section 215 [of the USA PATRIOT 
Act]62 directing certain telecommunications service providers to produce to the 
                                                
58  Mitchell Dean, ‘Power at the Heart of the Present: Exception, Risk and Sovereignty’ (2010) 13 European 
Journal of Cultural Studies 459, 464. 
59  For a detailed insight into these disclosures and Snowden’s actions and motivations, see Glenn 
Greenwald, No Place to Hide: Edward Snowden, the NSA and the Surveillance State (Penguin Books, 
2014).  
60  The FISC, established under the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 USC §§ 
1801–85 (1978) (‘FISA’), hears ex parte applications from the US government to authorise domestic 
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. The judges are drawn from the ranks of District 
Court and the matters are heard in secret, with no public records of proceedings. In the period since 1978 
the Court has approved over 20 000 requests and rejected only a handful. As Greenwald notes, its role 
appears to be more as a ‘part of the executive branch rather than as an independent judiciary exercising 
real oversight’: ibid 128. 
61  Glenn Greenwald, ‘NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily’, The 
Guardian (online), 6 June 2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-
verizon-court-order>. It was quickly revealed that other phone providers were also subject to such orders.  
62  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001, 50 USC § 1861 (‘USA PATRIOT Act’). 
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NSA on a daily basis electronic copies of “call detail records.”’63 The second of 
Snowden’s leaks detailed the collection of online user data from major US 
technology companies such as Google and Apple, by the government as part of a 
program known as ‘PRISM’.64 We can see here the ability of governments to 
‘outsource’ the collection of data to private corporations whose data collection 
crosses jurisdictional boundaries with impunity. Again the US government 
confirmed the existence of such a program, but claimed that it was targeted only 
at non-US citizens, and was authorised under the FISA.65 
Both the section 215 and PRISM programs are designed around the fact that 
different legal frameworks apply in the US with respect to surveillance of 
‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’ persons.66 Any surveillance of a US person must comply 
with constitutional and legal requirements, notably obtaining a warrant. 
However, legal restrictions upon surveillance without a warrant do not apply to 
non-US persons located outside of the US. Thus two very different surveillance 
frameworks exist in theory, but with global networks of communication and the 
centrality of the US to the global internet and communication industries, these 
boundaries appear to have become very blurred. US citizens were appalled that 
their constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment67 appeared to have been 
violated. 
Well before Snowden’s revelations, there had been concerns expressed 
regarding the data gathering activities of the NSA. In February 2013, the US 
Supreme Court handed down its decision regarding a group of lawyers, non-
governmental organisations (‘NGOs’), human rights, labour, and media 
organisations who sought a declaration that section 1881a of the FISA was 
unconstitutional,68 and a permanent injunction against section 1881a-authorised 
                                                
63  Klayman v Obama, 957 F Supp 2d 1, 10 (D DC, 2013). The case notes the various public statements 
made by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence following Snowden’s disclosures: at 10 n 9. 
See, eg, James R Clapper, Director of National Intelligence, ‘DNI Statement on Recent Unauthorized 
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of-classified-information?tmpl=component&format=pdf>.  
64  Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, ‘NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, Google and 
Others’, The Guardian (online), 7 June 2013 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-
giants-nsa-data>.  
65  FISA § 1881a; Dan Roberts, Spencer Ackerman and Tania Branigan, ‘Clapper Admits Secret NSA 
Surveillance Program to Access User Data’, The Guardian (online), 8 June 2013 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/07/clapper-secret-nsa-surveillance-prism>. 
66  USA PATRIOT Act, 50 USC §§ 1861, 1881 (2001). 
67  United States Constitution amend IV. It establishes:  
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.  
68  Clapper v Amnesty International USA, 133 S Ct 1138, 1142 (Alito J). The respondents argued that § 1881 
violated the Fourth and First Amendments, art III of the Constitution and the separation of powers 
principles: at 7 [C]. 
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surveillance.69 The respondents claimed that their work required them to ‘engage 
in sensitive and sometimes privileged communications’ via ‘telephone and email 
with their clients, colleagues, sources’ and ‘other’ relevant parties who may be 
located outside of the US.70 They claimed that some of the people with whom 
they exchanged information were likely to be targets of surveillance under 
section 1881a, including those ‘people the Government “believes or believed to 
be associated with terrorist organizations,” “people located in geographic areas 
that are a special focus” of the Government’s counterterrorism or diplomatic 
effort, and activists who oppose governments that are supported by the United 
States Government.’71 The threat of surveillance compromised their ability to 
communicate with their clients and other important sources, chilled their ability 
to communicate and required additional measures to protect the confidentiality of 
their communications, including travelling overseas to meet face to face, and 
other measures.72 
Section 1881a authorises the US Attorney-General and the Director of 
National Intelligence to ‘acquire foreign intelligence information by jointly 
authorising the surveillance of individuals who are not ‘United States persons’ 
and are reasonably believed to be located outside of the US’.73 Normally, the 
approval of the FISC is also required and, as the Supreme Court observed, 
surveillance is subject to ‘statutory conditions, judicial authorization, 
congressional supervision, and compliance with the Fourth Amendment.’74 The 
case revolved around the question of standing, whether the respondents could 
establish injury in fact based on their claim that there was a strong likelihood that 
their communications would be acquired under section 1881a in the future thus 
causing them injury, or alternatively that they were sustaining injury as a 
consequence of the fact that the risk of section 1881a-authorised surveillance was 
requiring them to take ‘costly and burdensome measures to protect the 
confidentiality of their international communications.’75 The Supreme Court held 
that the respondents lacked the requisite standing on the basis that they had no 
actual knowledge of the government’s targeting practices under section 1881a 
and that claims of fears of widespread surveillance of the communications were 
merely speculative.76 Further, the Court held the respondents could not establish 
that the interception may be authorised under some other provision of FISA, nor 
                                                
69  Section 1881a was added to FISA by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act 
of 2008 Pub L No 110–261, 122 Stat 2436 (2008). 
70  Clapper v Amnesty International USA, 133 S Ct 1138, 1145 (Alito J). 
71  Ibid, quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 399a. 
72  Clapper v Amnesty International USA, 133 S Ct 1138, 1145–6 (Alito J). 
73  FISA §1801(i) states that ‘United States person’ includes US citizens, aliens admitted for permanent 
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74  Clapper v Amnesty International USA, 133 S Ct 1138, 1144 (Alito J). 
75  Ibid 1143 (Alito J). 
76  Ibid 1143, 1148–50. Eg, the Court cites journalist Christopher Hedges: ‘I have no choice but to assume 
that any of my international communications may be subject to government surveillance, and I have to 
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could they demonstrate that even if the government sought to invoke surveillance 
of communications with their foreign contacts ‘that the FISC would authorise 
such surveillance’, that the communications could actually be acquired nor that 
their own communications would be caught up in such surveillance.77 Any costs 
incurred by the respondents in attempting to avoid surveillance were based on 
their own ‘fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending.’78 
Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion, which concluded that, based on the 
nature of the communications engaged in by the respondents, the past conduct of 
the government and the capacity to undertake the surveillance, there ‘is a high 
probability that the Government will intercept at least some electronic 
communication to which at least some of the plaintiffs are parties.’79 It was 
therefore wrong to characterise the harm threatened to the respondents as 
‘speculative’ and ‘at least some’ of the respondents were entitled to standing.80  
Of course, just how ‘speculative’ these claims were was revealed with 
dramatic consequences only a few months later when the government was forced 
by Snowden’s revelations to confirm its existence and consider how it could 
combat the massive anger of its own and foreign citizens, and the consequent 
collateral damage it had inflicted on its own technology industry. What had been 
merely speculative in February was confirmed as widespread practice in June.  
 
B    US Government Responses 
The surveillance practices of the US government outlined above were 
reviewed in the Report and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group 
on Intelligence and Communications Technologies: Liberty and Security in  
a Changing World, 81  commissioned by President Obama in August 2013  
and released in December 2013. The report was commissioned in response to 
public and global pressure brought to bear on the US President regarding how he 
would respond to the Snowden revelations, which were having serious fallout for 
the US worldwide. However, in addition to the section 215 program and PRISM 
revelations, further disclosures continued to flow from Snowden. Not only  
was the US now implicated in spying on governments of hostile nations, it had 
been caught tapping the phone of German Chancellor Angela Merkel.82 Further, 
several governments allied with the US, including the UK and Australia, were 
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implicated in mass surveillance practices, including spying on one another’s 
citizens.83 
The fact that US technology companies had been the instrument of 
widespread user surveillance also generated massive user backlash and a 
commercial headache for these companies who depend heavily upon user trust. 
The Obama regime was forced into damage control.  
The Liberty and Security Report identified a number of principles which 
should underpin intelligence collection activities into the future. 
‘1. The United States Government must protect, at once, two different forms 
of security: national security and personal privacy.’84 This statement highlights 
the dualistic nature of the concept of ‘security’, reflecting both the concepts of 
national security and defence against enemies of the United States, 85  and  
the articulation in the Fourth Amendment of the right of the people of the  
United States ‘to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,  
against unreasonable searches and seizures’.86 This notion of security has created 
significant conceptual problems in defining the scope of the right of privacy. As 
Wacks has observed, the inclusion of security against unreasonable searches and 
seizures in the Fourth Amendment has manifested in the grafting of notions of 
personal autonomy onto the concept of personal privacy.87 According to Wacks, 
this lack of conceptual clarity, contained within the original Warren and Brandeis 
thesis on privacy, was further complicated by Prosser’s gloss, which added 
concepts of personal freedoms, including speech and personal autonomy, to 
concepts of confidentiality.88 Justice Brandeis equated this right of privacy to 
both the ‘the right to be let alone’ and to the essential right of self-fulfilment, as 
the capacity to fully and freely express one’s thoughts and emotions are a vital 
part of an individual’s pursuit of happiness.89 As Wacks points out, this conflates 
two entirely different concepts: confidentiality and autonomy.90 Therefore, there 
are tensions within the very concept of privacy as well as in the various roles it is 
expected to perform. Thus the wording of the Fourth Amendment complicates 
the concept of privacy, posing significant difficulties in articulating a clear, 
meaningful and legally enforceable concept of ‘privacy’. 
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‘2. The central task is one of risk management; multiple risks are involved, 
and all of them must be considered.’91 In addition to the obvious question of risks 
to national security, public officials should consider ‘risks to privacy’, ‘risks to 
freedom and civil liberties, on the Internet and elsewhere’, risks to the 
relationships of the US with other nations, and ‘risks to trade and commerce, 
including international commerce.’92 These ‘other’ risks, it could be argued, were 
overlooked (or overridden) by the section 215 and PRISM collection programs. It 
appears to be a case of the practical fact that such data can be collected and 
therefore it should be collected. 
‘3. The idea of “balancing” has an important element of truth, but it is also 
inadequate and misleading.’93 The determination of the correct nature of the 
scope of surveillance could not be determined by a simple balancing exercise 
between the two identified forms of security (national and personal).94 In fact, 
some other relevant considerations are also subject to this balancing exercise, 
such as: surveillance should not be conducted in order to  
punish … political enemies; to restrict freedom of speech or religion; to suppress 
legitimate criticism and dissent; to help … preferred companies or industries; to 
provide domestic companies with an unfair competitive advantage; or to benefit or 
burden members of groups defined in terms of religion, ethnicity, race and 
gender.95 
‘4. The government should base its decisions on a careful analysis of 
consequences, including both benefits and costs (to the extent feasible).’ 96 
Application of this final principle appears absent from the implementation, 
operation and continuation of the section 215 and PRISM programs. There is a 
clear reluctance to forego the access to data which may be relevant to a security 
risk or criminal investigation. Rather than seek a warrant for relevant data as a 
need arises, all data is captured in the belief of its potential usefulness, and as 
noted above, the capture of this mass data set then facilitates downstream 
unanticipated (and potentially uncontrolled) uses. Further, studies have 
confirmed that far from consisting of unidentified snippets of non-personal data, 
telephony metadata ‘can be extremely revealing, both at the level of individual 
calls and, especially, in the aggregate.’97 The metadata is easily searchable and 
can reveal details regarding an individual’s personal circumstances, location, 
political, religious and sexual preferences and relationships with others.  
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The Report’s 46 recommendations reflect the extensive damage inflicted on 
US government and business interests by the Snowden revelations. A number of 
the key recommendations will be highlighted here. 
Unsurprisingly, the Report does not recommend the abolition of surveillance 
and intelligence gathering activities. Rather, the Report begins with the 
acknowledgement that the US ‘must continue to collect signals intelligence 
globally in order to assure the safety of [US] citizens at home and abroad and to 
help protect the safety of our friends, our allies, and the many nations with whom 
we have cooperative relationships.’98 However, it does recommend the end of 
bulk storage of data under section 215 of FISA and that metadata should be 
transferred to a private provider who would store such data for interrogation  
by the government as appropriate for national security purposes. 99  Further, 
telephone, internet and other service providers should be able to publicly disclose 
general information about orders they receive requiring them to provide 
information to the government, such as the number of requests received, 
categories of information provided and the numbers of users involved. 100 
Safeguards need to be put in place to ensure that the collection of information 
from non-US persons is subject to additional safeguards, including prohibitions 
on obtaining information for commercial gain for domestic industries.101 
The Report examines in detail the question of what privacy interests are 
implicated by the mass collection of metadata from phone and internet records of 
individuals and businesses.102  Noting that the Fourth Amendment had been 
interpreted by the US Supreme Court in a series of decisions in the 1970s to 
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allow collection of information voluntarily shared with third parties, the Report 
observes the possible emergence of a need to reconsider the approach that 
individuals have no ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in this information 
(whilst observing that it is not the role of the Report to interpret the Fourth 
Amendment in this context, leaving that decision to the Supreme Court).103 The 
continuing validity and scope of application of this line of authority in the digital 
era was raised but not resolved in United States v Jones,104 which concerned the 
constitutionality of the surveillance of an individual suspected of drug 
trafficking, by attaching a GPS to his car. The Court concluded (by majority) that 
the installation of the GPS was a ‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment, but declined to further consider the argument that such surveillance 
was legitimate based on the argument that an individual’s movements along 
public roads are voluntarily disclosed to third parties in accordance with the logic 
of Miller and Smith.105 Thus until Miller and Smith are reviewed by the Supreme 
Court, they remain good law, and create a low threshold test regarding privacy of 
individual information. 
The Report acknowledges that the bulk collection of undigested, non-public 
personal information about individuals involves serious implications of invasions 
of privacy. Essentially people must reveal personal information to banks, phone 
companies, health providers and so on in order to participate in modern society, 
so the question of whether the person has voluntarily decided to reveal such 
information is moot.106 Notably this discussion leaves aside any related questions 
regarding the status of disclosures made to social networking sites, now used as a 
major conduit of communication. Further, there is a real concern that people are 
becoming increasingly aware of the fact that their personal information is being 
monitored, collated and used and therefore may be prevented from fully 
participating in society as a consequence, contrary to the purposes of the Fourth 
and First Amendments.107 
The Report notes the damage that can potentially be caused by aggressive 
surveillance practices not only to US businesses, but further to the future 
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openness of the internet, and even democracy itself.108 It highlights the large 
losses caused to US cloud computing providers due to concerns regarding their 
implication in US surveillance, harming US economic growth.109  
Further, the US agenda regarding internet freedom has been seriously 
undermined by the revelations. Not only does this create the potential for harm to 
US internet business interests, but also sustains calls for closed and localised 
internet models contrary to US policy on the future of the global internet.110 
The concern regarding harm to US internet and technology companies is not 
overstated. Snowden’s leaked documents included a PowerPoint presentation 
prepared for the NSA identifying by name and logo the technology companies, 
including Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook and Apple, that participated in 
the PRISM program (this following immediately upon similar revelation 
regarding telephone companies).111 The companies issued denials regarding their 
involvement in the mass collection of data, but they could not deny that they had 
been compelled to provide records to the US Government.112 They had not 
however been allowed to reveal their involvement due to the fact they were 
prevented by a court order. This complicity with covert surveillance of global 
internet users threatened the very substance of the internet, undermining the 
characterisation of the internet and technology companies as the engine of free 
speech. Rather the internet could become ‘a means of widespread surveillance’.113 
Businesses such as Google base their whole business model on asking their users 
to trust them with vast amounts of data, making them very attractive data 
sources. However, without that trust their businesses will shrink and possibly 
fail: imagine a Facebook or Instagram where people refuse to post any personal 
information.  
The technology companies went into damage control mode issuing the 
Global Government Surveillance Reform statement calling for reform of 
government surveillance practices.114 In particular, they claimed, collection of 
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information should be transparent and sufficiently targeted. Governments should 
not ‘undertake’ or require ‘bulk data collection of internet communications’.115 
Recognising the potential for significant harms to US business interests, as 
well as the broader harm of the potential ‘balkani[sation]’ of the internet, 
President Obama released the Presidential Policy Directive on 17 January 
2014.116 Section 1 confirms that ‘[p]rivacy and civil liberties shall be integral 
considerations in the planning of U.S. signals intelligence activities.’117 Signals 
intelligence may not be collected for other purposes, such as suppressing speech, 
nor to offer a competitive advantage to US businesses.118 The Directive is clear 
on the point that collection of bulk data will continue. However, new limits are to 
be imposed on the use of that data. Data may be used for the purposes of 
detecting and countering: espionage and threats against the US from terrorism, 
spying and other activities, weapons of mass destruction, cybersecurity; threats to 
US and Allied armed forces and other personnel and transnational criminal 
threats.119 At the same time, President Obama announced a number of other 
reforms, designed to increase accountability and transparency regarding the US 
government’s surveillance activities, including some declassification of orders of 
the FISC, which provides review of the program targeting foreign individuals 
outside of the US and the section 215 telephony metadata program discussed 
above.120 Further, the section 215 program will be replaced with a new procedure. 
Noting the recommendations of the Review Group that a third party rather than 
the government retains the bulk data, which may then be interrogated by the 
government on an as needs basis, President Obama reflected on the complexities 
generated by such an approach: 
Relying solely on the records of multiple providers, for example, could require 
companies to alter their procedures in ways that raise new privacy concerns. On 
the other hand, any third party maintaining a single, consolidated database would 
be carrying out what is essentially a government function but with more expense, 
more legal ambiguity, potentially less accountability -- all of which would have a 
doubtful impact on increasing public confidence that their privacy is being 
protected.121 
These announcements were criticised as merely a publicity stunt in order to 
direct attention away from the harm being inflicted on the US technology 
                                                
115  AOL et al, The Principles (2014) Reform Government Surveillance <https://www.reformgovernment 
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119  Ibid 3. 
120  Barack Obama, ‘Remarks by the President on Review of Signals Intelligence’ (Speech delivered at the 
Department of Justice, Washington, D C, 17 January 2014) <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2014/01/17/remarks-president-review-signals-intelligence>. 
121  Ibid. 
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industry.122 Indeed, little reform has been effected since January 2014. As noted 
above, bulk collection of telephony metadata by the NSA has ceased (although 
still conducted by third parties) but the USA Freedom Act,123 intended to restrict 
the surveillance powers of the NSA with respect to the internet, has fallen victim 
to political maneuvering, despite significant lobbying from the US technology 
industries.124 The revised Act passed the House in May 2014 with none of the 
safeguards against continued surveillance that had been anticipated.125 Therefore 
mass data capture remains legal in the US.126 
 
C    US Judicial Responses 
Of course, Snowden’s revelations also demonstrated that the collection of 
data described by the Supreme Court as speculative, was in fact actually 
occurring, opening the door again for challenges to the constitutionality of such 
practices. By December 2013, two conflicting District Court decisions had been 
handed down on the question of standing to sue on the constitutionality of bulk 
collection of telephony metadata: Klayman v Obama,127 and decision reached a 
different outcome. The plaintiffs in Klayman commenced two actions, one 
related to the capture of telephone data from Verizon, brought against the NSA, 
the Department of Justice, President Obama and several other executive officials, 
as well as Verizon (‘Klayman I’), and the second with respect to the monitoring 
of internet services, brought against the same government defendants and 
Facebook, Yahoo!, Google, Microsoft, YouTube, AOL, PalTalk, Skype, Sprint, 
AT&T and Apple (‘Klayman II’). Both claims alleged that the government 
violated the plaintiffs’ rights under the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments and 
the Administrative Procedure Act by exceeding its authority under FISA.128 In 
Klayman I the Court held that the plaintiffs had ‘standing to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Government’s bulk collection and querying of phone 
record metadata, that they have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success 
                                                
122  Glenn Greenwald, ‘Obama’s NSA “Reforms” Are Little More than a PR Attempt to Mollify the Public’, 
The Guardian (online), 18 January 2014 <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jan/17/ 
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123 HR 3361, 113th Congress (2013). 
124  See, eg, Steve Wilson (ed), ‘Mark Zuckerberg Tells Barack Obama He Is 'Frustrated' over US 
Government Surveillance’, The Telegraph (online), 14 March 2014 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ 
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125  Spencer Ackerman, ‘Edward Snowden, a Year On: Reformers Frustrated as NSA Preserves Its Power’, 
The Guardian (online), 5 June 2014 <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/05/edward-snowden-
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data, the so-called “backdoor search” provision’: see Spencer Ackerman, ‘House of Representatives 
Moves to Ban NSA’s “Backdoor Search” Provision’, The Guardian (online), 21 June 2014 
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127  957 F Supp 2d 1 (D Colo, 2013). 
128  Klayman v Obama, 957 F Supp 2d 1, 11 (Leon J) (D Colo, 2013). 
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on the merits of their Fourth Amendment claim, and that they will suffer 
irreparable harm absent preliminary injunctive relief.’129  However, given the 
national security interests implicated in the case, the injunction would be stayed 
pending appeal.130  
In American Civil Liberties Union v Clapper,131 Pauley III DJ reached the 
opposite conclusion, finding that the bulk telephony metadata program is lawful 
and not susceptible to a constitutional challenge. Revisiting the claims that had 
been made in the earlier Supreme Court case of Clapper v Amnesty International 
USA, the American Civil Liberties Union (‘ACLU’) based its claim on three 
sources of injury: 
1. the ‘collection of … metadata related to the ACLU’s phone calls’;132  
2. the search of the metadata related to the ACLU’s phone calls when the 
NSA checks the phone numbers three ‘hops’ away from the ‘seed’ 
number (ie, the number which is the subject of the search); and 
3. the chilling effect on all those who may hesitate to make contact with the 
ACLU due to knowledge that the NSA will have a record that such a 
telephone number was used to make that contact with the ACLU.133 
In this case, however, the ACLU was granted standing on the basis that it was 
no longer in dispute that the government had collected the metadata relating to 
the ACLU’s phone calls.134 With respect to the argument under the Fourth 
Amendment, the ACLU argued that: 
analysis of bulk telephony metadata allows the creation of a rich mosaic: it can 
‘reveal a person’s religion, political associations, use of a telephone-sex hotline, 
contemplation of suicide, addiction to gambling or drugs, experience with rape, 
grappling with sexuality, or support for particular political causes.135  
The Court rejected this argument and noted that ‘[t]he collection of 
breathtaking amounts of information unprotected by the Fourth Amendment does 
not transform that sweep into a Fourth Amendment search.’136 Declaring that the 
Court was still bound by the decision in Smith, the Court concluded that there 
was no violation of the Fourth Amendment:  
The right to be free from searches and seizures is fundamental, but not absolute … 
Every day, people voluntarily surrender personal and seemingly-private 
information to transnational corporations, which exploit that data for profit. Few 
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131 959 F Supp 2d 724 (SD NY, 2013) (‘ACLU v Clapper’). 
132  Ibid 735 (Pauley III J). 
133  Ibid 736 (Pauley III J). 
134  Ibid 38 [4] (Pauley III J). 
135  Ibid 750 [33] (Pauley III J), citing Edward W Felten, ‘Supplementary Declaration of Professor Edward W 
Felten’, Submission in American Civil Liberties Union v Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 
13-cv-03994 (WHP), 26 August 2013.  
136  ACLU v Clapper, 959 F Supp 2d 724, 752 [33] (Pauley III J) (SD NY, 2013). 
736 UNSW Law Journal Volume 37(2) 
think twice about it, even though it is far more intrusive than bulk telephony 
metadata collection.137 
The section 215 and PRISM scenarios generate fundamental questions 
regarding the nature of privacy in the US. Does privacy exist solely in the context 
of the Fourth Amendment and, given the limitations in the Fourth Amendment 
flagged above, do these concerns need more specific protection in the digital 
age? This would need to take account of consumer practices and internet business 
models, such as the extent of personal information collected by service providers 
like Pandora. This would most likely require specific and targeted legislation.138 
 
D    UK Responses to Surveillance 
UK privacy law has been complicated by the impact of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’).139 Common law evolution of privacy 
law under tortious and equitable principles has had to adapt to address 
requirements under the ECHR, through the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) c 42.140 
Privacy concepts have been dealt with under breach of confidence (equity) and 
the nascent doctrine of misuse of private information (tort). In addition, the UK 
has enacted the Data Protection Act 1998 (UK) c 29 which implements the 
European Union (‘EU’) Data Protection Directive.141  
The UK has been directly caught up in the outcomes of the Snowden 
revelations, with the UK being one of the ‘Five Eyes’ partners with the US, as 
well as revelations regarding the UK’s own mass data surveillance program 
through the Government Communications Head Quarters.142 However, no law 
reform has been proposed in the wake of the revelations, but rather a review of 
internet surveillance practices and their control and oversight in the UK has been 
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commissioned, to be conducted by the independent think tank, Royal United 
Services Institute (‘RUSI’).143 
A recent UK High Court decision in which Tugendhat J confirmed the 
existence in the UK of a tort of misuse of private information provides some 
useful guidance regarding how anonymous and collated data may be viewed in a 
privacy context in the UK: Vidal-Hall v Google Inc.144 In this case three UK-
based users of Google alleged that Google had misused their private information 
and acted in breach of confidence and their statutory duties under section 4(4) of 
the Data Protection Act 1998 c 29 by tracking and collating information relating 
to their internet usage using the Safari browser in 2011 and 2012, such as which 
websites they visited, how frequently they visited the sites, how long they spent 
on the site and in what order sites were visited. The essence of their claim is that 
Google collected information from their computers, and other internet enabled 
devices, regarding their browsing habits. Each claimant specified in a 
confidential schedule their ‘individual personal characteristics, interests, wishes 
and ambitions,’ which they used as the basis of the claim that: 
they suffered distress, when they learnt that such matters were forming the basis 
for advertisements targeted at them, or when they learnt that, as a result of such 
targeted advertisements, such matters had in fact, or might well have, come to the 
knowledge of third parties who they had permitted to use their devices, or to view 
their screens.145  
The claimants’ damage is based upon the harm caused to them by the fact 
that their apparent interests (deduced from their browsing habits) were used to 
target advertising to them which disclosed certain information about them based 
on those interests as evidenced in their online habits. Those advertisements, and 
the personal information that they disclosed, may have or had been viewed by 
third parties viewing the claimants’ devices.146 Justice Tugendhat noted that, 
whilst targeted advertisements which merely reveal the employment of the user 
may not cause any damage: 
if the targeted advertisements apparently reveal other information about the users, 
whether about their personalities, or their immediate plans or ambitions, then if 
these matters are sensitive, or related to protected characteristics (e.g., beliefs), or 
to secret wishes or ambitions, then the fear that others who see the screen may find 
out those matters, and act upon what they have seen, may well be worrying and 
distressing.147 
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Whilst all of the claimants claimed acute distress and anxiety, none of them 
claimed to have suffered any discrimination or other direct harm.148 
Justice Tugendhat had to decide the preliminary matter of whether the 
claimants could serve their claim out of jurisdiction. Therefore the Court’s 
decisions on more specific matters relating to the misuse of private information 
claim were of a preliminary nature only. Google was resisting the application for 
service outside of jurisdiction. In order to satisfy the requirements of the service 
out rules, the claimants framed their argument on a number of grounds including 
tort. With respect to this claim, Google argued that the cause of action based on 
misuse of private information or breach of confidence was not a tort; that no 
significant physical or economic harm was suffered by the claimants and the act 
complained of was not committed in the jurisdiction. 
Whilst Tugendhat J asserted that it was clear that ‘a claim for breach of 
confidence is not a claim in tort,’149 the position may be different with respect to 
misuse of private information.150 
Justice Tugendhat then quoted directly from Lord Nicholls in Campbell v 
MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457: 
This cause of action has now firmly shaken off the limiting constraint of the need 
for an initial confidential relationship. In doing so it has changed its nature. In this 
country this development was recognised clearly in the judgment of Lord Goff of 
Chieveley in Attorney-General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 
109, 281. Now the law imposes a ‘duty of confidence’ whenever a person receives 
information he knows or ought to know is fairly and reasonably to be regarded as 
confidential. Even this formulation is awkward. The continuing use of the phrase 
‘duty of confidence’ and the description of the information as ‘confidential’ is not 
altogether comfortable. Information about an individual's private life would not, in 
ordinary usage, be called ‘confidential’. The more natural description today is that 
such information is private. The essence of the tort is better encapsulated now as 
misuse of private information.151 
Justice Tugendhat then highlighted Lord Nicholls’ observation that the 
privacy tort and the equitable action of breach of confidence, although related, 
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should be treated separately.152 Noting that ‘there have since been a number of 
cases in which misuse of private information has been referred to as a tort 
consistently with OBG and these cannot be dismissed as all errors in the use of 
the words “tort”’.153 Justice Tugendhat concluded ‘that the tort of misuse of 
private information is a tort’ within the meaning of the relevant rules.’154 
Therefore the claimants’ claim for damages fell within the requirements of the 
rules relating to service out.155  
On the question of whether the information was private, it was submitted on 
behalf of Google that the information collected about the claimants browsing 
habits was anonymous and not private:  
The aggregation of such information sent to separate websites and advertising 
services cannot make it private information. One hundred times zero is zero, so 
one hundred pieces of non-private information cannot become private information 
when collected together.156  
Justice Tugendhat rejected this approach, noting that Google would not have 
gone to the effort to collect and collate this information unless it resulted in 
‘something of value’.157 Further, he concluded the fact that individual Google 
employees do not identify or recognise the identity of people from whom the data 
is collected is ‘irrelevant’.158 At some point the claimant becomes identifiable as a 
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result of the collation and use of the information, in this case, at the point where 
the targeted advertisements become visible on their screen by a third party.159 
Justice Tugendhat conceded that not all of the generated information would give 
rise to claims of privacy. However, in the individual cases the particular types of 
information identified by the claimants was private information.160  
This case illustrates the complex relationship between the concerns of 
privacy law and protection of private information. As is noted by the Court the 
argument made by Google that generic, harvested information, which can be 
used to generate highly detailed predictive profiles of an individual and then used 
to direct personally targeted information back to them, is not ‘private’ seems 
disingenuous in the specific context. Yet it is just these practices which are being 
used by online service providers to generate and sell targeted advertising profiles. 
They are based on voluntarily disclosed data, creating a contractual, but little 
understood, relationship with a user. As this case illustrates, further exploration 
of the relationships between consent, disclosure and collection and use of 
information is required. Further, as the law currently stands, the algorithmic 
intervention in such data may create a sufficient disconnect with the user to avoid 
any liability under privacy law. Thus law reform is needed to address these 
issues. 
Notably, there seems to be movement in the EU on the attitudes towards 
mass data collection. In April 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
held, in the joined cases C-293/12 and C-594/12,161 that the EU Data Retention 
Directive162 is invalid, on the basis that in casting the terms of the Directive, the 
EU legislature had exceeded the limits of the principle of proportionality in 
relation to Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.163 The Data Retention Directive was intended to harmonise the 
laws of Member States with respect to the collection and retention of data 
generated or processed in the course of the supply of communications services, 
by providers of publicly available electronic communications services or of a 
public communications network, ie, internet and telephone records. 164  Data 
gathering on this scale was justified as essential for the purposes of national 
security, anti-terrorism and for the prevention of crime.165 As with the US system 
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of data retention, the Directive authorised the collection of data related to 
location, time, duration of call but not content of the message or 
communication.166 However, again, as has already been observed with respect to 
the metadata collection in the US, the European Court of Justice observed that 
the nature of the data collected could generate a very detailed record relating to 
the individuals concerned, such as their location, who they are communicating 
with, how and for how long and how frequently they are communicating, and the 
time and place of the communication.167 Whilst the collection of such data may 
be justified on the basis of the general interest in the prevention of crime and 
national security, the Directive infringed too far upon fundamental rights to 
respect for private life and to the protection of personal data. The retention and 
use of such data would subject people to the feeling that they were under constant 
surveillance.168 The effect of this decision will be to require amendment of 
national legislation, including that of the UK, to take account of this ruling. 
Notably the decision encompasses both private life (privacy) and personal data 
(data protection). 
Shortly following this decision, the EU Data Protection Working Party 
adopted Opinion 04/2014 on Surveillance of Electronic Communications for 
Intelligence and National Security Purposes.169 Concluding that ‘secret, massive 
and indiscriminate surveillance programs are incompatible with our fundamental 
laws and cannot be justified by the fight against terrorism or other important 
threats to national security’,170 the Opinion makes a number of recommendations. 
These included greater transparency on how data is collected and used, clearer 
laws surrounding data sharing, effective oversight of intelligence services and 
enforcing compliance with protections and freedoms under the ECHR.171 It is 
therefore likely that UK laws will be strengthened to reflect greater control over 
the use of data generated as a consequence of personal communications and 
transactions. Again, privacy seems a woefully inadequate tool to regulate the use 
of big data. 
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IV    THE AUSTRALIAN CONTEXT 
Like the UK, Australian law adopts a piecemeal approach to protection of 
various privacy interests.172 The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) is primarily concerned 
with data protection,173 and imposes obligations on ‘APP entities’174 – particularly 
Australian government agencies, private organisations with a turnover of more 
than $3 million and certain small businesses 175  – regarding the collection, 
handling and use of ‘personal information’. ‘Personal information’ is defined in 
section 6(1) of the Act as: 
information or an opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is 
reasonably identifiable: 
(a) whether the information or opinion is true or not; and 
(b) whether the information or opinion is recorded in a material form or not. 
This limitation to an identified or reasonably identifiable individual 
immediately restricts its relevance in the seemingly anonymised big data context. 
Australian government agencies, when collecting or managing citizens’ data, are 
also subject to a range of legislative controls, and must comply with the a number 
of Acts and regulations. 176  There are also many forms of overlapping and 
sometimes inconsistent anti-surveillance laws.177 Protection of privacy interests 
may also arise in the context of the breach of confidence action, far more limited 
in the Australian context by the requirement of a pre-existing relationship or 
understanding, than in the evolving UK doctrine.178 Additionally, there is nascent 
recognition of a common law tort of privacy in Australian common law.179  
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Recently, the Australian government has strengthened the Privacy Act 
(through the passing of the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) 
Bill 2012 (Cth) to enhance the protection of and set clearer boundaries for usage 
of personal information.180 The Australian Law Reform Commission (‘ALRC’) 
has also recommended the introduction of a statutory cause of action for a 
‘serious invasion of privacy’.181 The suggested introduction of a stand-alone tort 
is intended to address a range of privacy intrusions, including physical invasions 
of privacy and online abuses, but is not specifically directed at data privacy.182 
The elements of the suggested tort are an ‘intentional or reckless invasion of 
privacy’ by: 
(a) intrusion into the plaintiff’s seclusion or private affairs (including by 
unlawful surveillance); or 
(b) misuse or disclosure of private information about the plaintiff.183 
The proposed action is also subject to the conditions that: 
A person in the position of the plaintiff would have had a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in all of the circumstances … The court must consider that the invasion 
of privacy was ‘serious’, in all the circumstances, having regard to, among other 
things, whether the invasion was likely to be highly offensive, distressing or 
harmful to a person of ordinary sensibilities in the position of the plaintiff … The 
court must be satisfied that the plaintiff’s interest in privacy outweighs the 
defendant’s interest in freedom of expression and any broader public interest in 
the defendant’s conduct.184 
A particular issue will be the role of consent as a defence to any breach of 
privacy under the proposed statutory cause of action. As the ALRC Discussion 
Paper notes there are many degrees to consent. In particular: ‘some have 
questioned whether clicking “I agree” to a 40 000-word term of a contract is, in 
fact, consent and there are calls for the whole issue of consent in the context of 
online services to be reviewed.’185 The Discussion Paper suggests that this debate 
should occur ‘in … the context of consumer protection.’186  
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The proposed protection of privacy as a tort is consistent with the UK 
approach outlined above.187 In addition, the ALRC contemplates that actions for 
breach of confidence would still continue to evolve.188 Therefore the scope of 
rights against invasions of personal privacy would appear to be expanded by the 
ALRC proposals. However, notably, the proposed statutory right of action 
applies only to unlawful surveillance.189 As Australia has no bill of rights or any 
constitutional protections akin to those outlined above with respect to the US, 
UK or EU it is unlikely that these changes will go any way to addressing the 
concerns regarding either government surveillance or the seemingly consensual 
collection of data about our online movements by platform providers with whom 
we ‘consent’ to exchange information in order to make use of their platform.  
Australia is one of the Five Eyes partners with the US (along with  
Canada, New Zealand, and the UK) and as such is involved in the collection  
and sharing of intelligence information about its own citizens and those  
of the other Five Eyes partners. Indeed in 2011, Australia, through the  
Defence Signals Directorate, sought enhanced surveillance of Australian  
citizens due to the ‘increasing number of Australians involved in  
international extremist activities’.190 Commonwealth ‘enforcement agencies’ can 
request historical communications data from service providers without a warrant 
under the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth), where 
the information is considered reasonably necessary for certain specified purposes 
including enforcement of the criminal law.191 The total number of requests must 
be reported annually. For example, in 2011–12, Australian law enforcement 
agencies, other than the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (‘ASIO’), 
made 293 501 requests for telecommunications data without a warrant or any 
judicial oversight.192 Unlike the CIA and the British intelligence agencies, ASIO 
has blanket immunity from freedom of information legislation.193  
In 2012, following a review of national security legislation, the then Labor 
Australian Government announced the proposed introduction of a requirement 
that carriage service providers retain data regarding use of internet and phone 
services for up to two years.194 In June 2013, the Parliamentary Joint Committee 
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on Intelligence and Security tabled its Report of the Inquiry into Potential 
Reforms of Australia’s National Security Legislation. 195  The data retention 
proposals were shelved pending the federal election. In December 2013 the 
Senate referred a comprehensive revision of the Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) to the Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs References Committee.196  However, the current Australian Attorney-
General announced in early August 2014 that internet service providers and 
telecommunications providers will be required to keep user metadata for two 
years in order to provide access to such data by law enforcement agencies.197 No 
formal procedures have yet been announced, with the proposal having only been 
flagged in press conferences. Some significant gaps have already been 
highlighted in the government’s overall understanding of how such a program 
may work but the details remain to be worked out.198 These proposals have 
attracted significant attention in light of the Snowden revelations. Again, it 
should be noted that as such collection involves metadata rather than the content 
of communications it will fall outside the scope of existing Australian privacy 
regimes. However, as the above analysis reveals the predictive value of such data 
cannot be overstated. 
Recent Australian cases highlight the vulnerability of personal data  
collection being posted online,199 how easily metadata can be obtained by outside 
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organisations and countries, and the lack of protection for individuals when their 
data collection is corrupted.200  
Australian privacy law therefore remains, like the US and UK law, woefully 
underdeveloped when it comes to protection of individuals’ metadata or 
‘voluntarily’ disclosed data. Many ubiquitous, day to day disclosures of data, 
such as postings on Facebook, use of search terms or hash tags, likes, retweets 
and public polls would be regarded as public rather than private disclosures. 
These disclosures are then used to develop detailed algorithmic profiles, to which 
no privacy regulation would apply, despite potential enduring and significant 
impacts of that profile. 
 
V    CONCLUSIONS 
Current technologies make surveillance and data capture a convenient by-
product of ordinary daily transactions and interactions. Data capture is so 
ubiquitous that it is easier to capture it all and interrogate it later. Little regard has 
been had to the individual privacy interests of citizens within this context and 
current privacy paradigms are ill-equipped to address algorithmic and predictive 
uses of big data. 
It must be recognised that threats to privacy can come equally from 
government and the private sector. The proposed US solution of ending bulk data 
storage by the government and transferring the responsibility to private providers 
carries with it the potential for continued exploitation. As demonstrated by 
Vidall-Hall v Google Inc, data mining can enable corporations to single out 
customers who are statistically profitable and calculate the exact minimum level 
to make customers loyal, therefore reinforcing the contractual power imbalances 
between consumers and producers.201  
Surveillance should require ‘legal process and the involvement of the 
judiciary to ensure that surveillance is targeted, justified, and no more extensive 
than is necessary’.202 Richards asserts that 
while covert domestic surveillance can be justified in discrete (and temporary) 
instances when there is rigorous judicial process, blanket surveillance of all 
internet activity menaces our intellectual privacy and gives the government too 
much power to blackmail or discriminate against the subjects of surveillance.203  
Further, the belief in the existence of constant monitoring operates as a 
chilling effect upon freedom of communication, deterring participation in the 
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democratic process. 204  In a free society, all forms of surveillance must be 
ultimately accountable to a self-governing public. Statutory law is easily 
adaptable and can be applied to bind both government and non-government 
actors. Accordingly, a meaningful legal process of issuing a warrant supported by 
probable cause needs to be followed before the government can perform the 
digital equivalent of reading our diaries or worse, making a decision on the basis 
of casting our horoscopes.  
It is important to follow the rule of law and have a member of the judiciary 
provide independent oversight of the use of coercive or invasive powers of data 
collection. Otherwise, the collection of big data is unhindered and unreviewable 
which undermines democracy. In addition, a statutory right to prevent misuse of 
information linked to or generated about a person from big data by both 
government and business would go some way to protect individual privacy. 
However, this would also necessitate significant changes to current internet-
based business models to prevent the bulk exploitation of our bulk data. Change 
is needed now to address these issues, before the rampant algorithms make it 
impossible to claw back what little privacy we retain in the online environment. 
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